Humor me and put aside the non-fly zone, the ostensive reason for Western intervention. You know and I know that this is all about ridding Libya of Qaddafi. Nearly from the get-go, Obama said, "Qaddafi must go." That is official US policy. Virtually no one objects to it. Not even the Arabs. The only question is how to go about it.
Yes, Qaddafi could simply fold his tent and decamp to Madagascar. There's a chance his generals will kill him. He might be garroted by a sexy member of his female Praetorian Guard (the perfect Hollywood ending). It's also possible that the rebels - re-energized by the coalition intervention - will shortly march on Tripoli and overwhelm the government by sheer "democratic" momentum. If any of these scenarios occur, the war is over. But, as the newest cliché goes, hope is not a strategy.
Call me foolish, but I say President Obama - a man renowned for his first-class intellect - is not plotting stratagems based on the, um, "audacity of hope." To suggest otherwise is absurd. Moreover, to suggest that Team Obama does not have a working strategy for Qaddafi's removal is equally absurd. Today, idiocy may reign supreme in the punditocracy, not at the White House, Foggy Bottom or the Pentagon.
Clueless columnists demand that Obama give us a PowerPoint presentation detailing his Libyan strategy, A-to-Z. That's like asking the CIA for "sources and methods" or the Pentagon for a target list in advance of airstrikes. Again, it is absurd. Beyond stating the goal and dropping a hint or two, the president has probably said all he can say publicly about ending Qaddafi.
But clues can be had if one pays attention to the prevarications and "non-denial denials" (repudiating a fact but leaving open the possibility that it is true). For example, when a reporter asked a top White House official if we were willing to offer Qaddafi safe passage if he left voluntarily, he equivocated but didn't deny it. Translation: Yes, we just can't say so - wink, wink.
I don't know what strategy Obama has in mind for ousting Qaddafi. Neither does anybody else in the chattering class. I do know it is tightly bound with events on the ground in Libya and will evolve as challenges emerge and opportunities present themselves. I also know that to maximize the odds of success in an era of train wreck journalism and mindless partisanship, Obama is better off keeping his cards close to his vest.
But if I had to guess, I'd bet Obama's strategy is a two-fold affair that leaves open opportunities for the "discovered check." First, I suspect we are offering Qaddafi a non-lethal way out - if he wants it. Though it might be satisfying to see the "Mad Dog of Libya" hanged, it is wiser to give him, his family and some percentage of his Swiss bank accounts safe passage to whatever country will take him. Since his departure would end the war overnight, this would be a small price to pay, as Fareed Zakaria has noted. Similarly, I suspect we are providing inducements to top Libyan generals and apparatchiks to either change sides or slip quietly into that good night. It is probably being framed as a one-time deal for staying off the face cards of the coming "Most Wanted" deck, Libyan Edition.
On the kinetic end of things, any realistic strategy must deal with this fact: The rebel "army" is a leaderless, disorganized rabble. It is why they have made so little progress despite allied air cover. Ignoring this problem invites a dangerous stalemate. So, I suspect the groundwork is quietly being laid to provide guns, ammo, radios, intelligence, medicine and food to the rebels. Overtly or covertly, small-footprint special forces units will be required for rebel training. (I'd volunteer the renowned French Foreign Legion. It has decades of experience and, as an added bonus, it would keep American boots off the ground.) Short of landing the Marines, this kind of foxhole-level support is the only way to fuel rebel momentum and meaningfully pressure Qaddafi loyalists to switch sides, stand aside or flee.
In the resolution of any conflict, be it in the diplomatic corridors of the UN or on a dusty battlefield, the opponent gets a vote. That means Obama's strategy will suffer setbacks and experience occasional forays down blind alleys. Allies in the coalition will bicker, sometimes bitterly, just like they did in World War II and the Bosnian War. Our Arab partners will vacillate on the application of power against Libya. All of this is to be expected as the fog of war shrouds the endgame.
But underestimating Obama is foolish. Though frustrating, our inability to see the entirety of his strategy is not evidence of its nonexistence. Few expected him to intervene in Libya, let alone pull together a NATO coalition with a UN mandate -- until he did. It is also worth remembering that Obama is an avid student of history. By now he knows America has successfully backed insurgents in the past using the tactics I've outlined above. So I would be surprised, nay stunned, if they are not part of the current strategy. If I'm wrong, I am perfectly prepared to gorge myself on a three-course meal of feathered crow.
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